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On 26 January 2020, thousands of people cheered as
four women hoisted the Indian flag in Shaheen Bagh,
a predominantly Muslim locality in New Delhi, which
had become the epicentre of protests against the highly
controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) that
was passed in December 2019. Three of the women re-
ferred to as the dadis (grandmothers) of Shaheen Bagh
– Bilkis (82), Asma Khatoon (90) and Sarvari (75) – were
leading figures in the sit-in protest in this locality that
began soon after the lawwas passed and that has inspired
scores of similar protests in other cities. The fourth, Rad-
hika Vemula, is the mother of Rohith Vemula, a Dalit stu-
dent whose suicide in January 2016 triggered widespread
protests against caste discrimination. The flag hoisting,
accompanied by the singing of the national anthem and
other patriotic songs, marked India’s 71st Republic Day,
which commemorates the coming into force of the In-
dian Constitution.1 It offered a popular counterpoint
to the annual state-orchestrated military parade in the
centre of New Delhi that is typically the focus of public
attention. On the same day in the southern state of Ker-
ala, seven million people formed a 620 kilometre-long
human chain stretching from one end of the state to the
other and took a mass oath to defend the Constitution
against what they saw as the CAA’s ‘attempts to subvert
and destroy it’.2
The demonstrations in Shaheen Bagh and Kerala
were two of thousands that rocked India for nearly three
months since mid-December 2019, when the CAA was
passed. The Act offers a fast track to citizenship for non-
Muslims fleeing religious persecution in predominantly
Muslim Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Its op-
ponents argue that in introducing a religious qualifica-
tion for Indian citizenship for the first time, it strikes at
the root of the Constitution’s commitment to secularism.
The Act follows on the heels of an effort to compile a
National Register of Citizens (NRC) in the northeastern
state of Assam, responding to long-running protests by
the state’s majority ethnic Assamese population against
immigration from neighbouring Indian states as well as
from Bangladesh.3 This registration exercise, justly de-
scribed as ‘one of the largest purges of citizenship in
history’, required all people in the state to demonstrate
proof of their citizenship.4 While the Assamese agitation
has historically been directed at all non-Assamese im-
migrants regardless of religion, India’s ruling Hindu su-
premacist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has championed
the demand for the NRC (and has promised to conduct
it on a countrywide basis) on the assumption that the
exercise would disenfranchise mostly Muslims. It did not
bargain for the possibility that many of the 1.9 million
people (in a state with a population of 33 million) who
failed to meet the onerous documentary requirements
of the Assam NRC would be Hindus. The CAA is widely
believed to be an attempt to offer a safety net for non-
Muslims who fail to demonstrate proof of citizenship in
the NRC exercise, putting in place a legal regime that will
target primarily Muslims for detention and deportation.5
Numbers cannot adequately convey the scale or fe-
rocity of the agitation against the NRC/CAA, which has
drawn people from all communities and which comment-
ators have described as the most significant upheaval
since the Emergency of 1975–77. Within three weeks of
the passage of the CAA, protests had taken place in 94
of India’s 732 districts across 14 of its 29 states. Thou-
sands of people were arrested. 31 were killed in an initial
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wave of police repression mostly in BJP-ruled states.6
Events took a darker turn in February 2020. The sit-in at
Shaheen Bagh had inspired scores of similar protests in
other cities. When one of these sprang up in Jaffrabad
in northeast Delhi, local BJP leader Kapil Mishra invited
his followers to clear the protesters off the streets if the
Delhi police did not do so within three days.7 His ulti-
matum was widely seen as a call to violence to which
Hindu mobs responded with a brutality not seen in the
city since the anti-Sikh riots of 1984.8 53 people, mostly
Muslims, were killed, and Muslim-owned properties and
mosques vandalised, while the police looked on and by
some accounts even participated in the violence.9
Throughout this period protests against the CAA con-
tinued, drawing thousands of people onto the streets in
marches and sit-ins and into conversations on social me-
dia where protest memes offered a running commentary
on the intricacies of the law as well as the state’s re-
sponse to the movement that it had brought into being.
The protests were remarkable as much for their peace-
fulness as for their earnest deployment of a repertoire
saturated with symbols of national identity, which is the
subject ofmy inquiry inwhat follows. Protesters wrapped
themselves, quite literally, in the national flag. Images
of leaders in the struggle for independence from British
rule such as Gandhi, Bhagat Singh and especially B. R.
Ambedkar – the foremost Dalit leader and chairperson
of the Drafting Committee of the Indian Constitution –
became talismans of the movement. Mirroring the lead-
ing role that Muslim and subordinate caste women have
played in the anti-CAA protests, the pavement library
that sprang up at Shaheen Bagh was named after Fatima
Sheikh and Savitribai Phule, both pioneering nineteenth-
century social reformers and educationists from these
communities.10 Protesters sang the national anthem and
embraced the Constitution of India on a scale and with
an affective intensity that is unprecedented, engaging
in mass readings of its Preamble and lingering over its
promise to constitute India into a ‘sovereign socialist
secular democratic republic’. Much of this came as a sur-
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prise even to seasoned analysts of Indian politics. Until
recently it was thought that India did not have a tradition
of constitutional patriotism akin to the United States.11
In contrast to the aural ubiquity of the pledge of allegi-
ance and the visual omnipresence of the stars and stripes,
until 2002 the Flag Code of India prohibited the use of
the flag by private citizens except on national holidays
and until 2005 the flag could not be displayed on clothes.
Commentators have remarked on the alacrity with which
pious Muslims have adopted secular nationalist symbols
to affirm their belonging alongside visible markers of
religious identification.12 In this article, I want to try to
make sense of the reasons for the widespread adoption of
a nationalist repertoire of protest in the current moment,
before turning to a critical evaluation of its potentials
and limits.
Nationalism by the state
The frisson inherent in the protesters’ take-up of nation-
alist symbols derives in part from a recognition that they
were being seized back from a Hindu Right which has de-
ployed them as a stick with which to beat its opponents.
The coercive imposition of a state-authorised national-
ism has been central to the BJP’s wider political and cul-
tural agenda since its return to power at the federal level
in 2014. The Shaheen Bagh sit-in was initiated by women
who were outraged by the police brutality unleashed on
students protesting on the campuses of the historically
Muslim Jamia Millia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim Univer-
sity in mid-December 2019, immediately after the CAA
had been passed. In early January 2020, masked mem-
bers of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP),
the student wing of the BJP, physically attacked students
and faculty at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in retali-
ation for their protests against the CAA, while the police
looked on. Long considered the intellectual bastion of
the left, JNU has over time become a microcosm of na-
tional politics with the rise of the ABVP on its campus
mirroring that of the BJP on the national stage.13 The
ABVP attacks were reminiscent of similar provocations
in 2016, which triggered widespread student resistance.
On that occasion, ABVP harassment in collusion with
authorities at the University of Hyderabad drove Dalit
activist Rohith Vemula to take his life. Around the same
time, ABVP activists accused communist student leader
Kanhaiya Kumar, then president of the JNU students’
union, of sedition in connection with a Kashmir solidar-
ity event that he had helped to organise, and instigated
the Delhi police to file charges against him. The state
has made enthusiastic use of the draconian sedition law
to crack down on dissidents of all stripes.
In addition to invoking the full wrath of the law, the
state also responded to the 2016 protests on university
campuses in an emphatically symbolic register. At ameet-
ing with the Minister of Human Resources Development,
whose portfolio includes the governance of universities,
the Vice-Chancellors of 42 central (federal) universities
agreed to fly the national flag from 207-foot high masts
to counter what they perceived as a rising tide of anti-
nationalism sweeping across their campuses.14 (So there
was a poignant irony in Radhika Vemula hoisting a flag
of her own four years later.) In 2017, the Vice-Chancellor
of JNU–widely perceived to be sympathetic to the Hindu
Right and to have facilitated the latest round of ABVP
violence – requested the government install a battle tank
on the JNU campus as a way of inculcating in students
a spirit of patriotism and an appreciation for the sacri-
fices made by soldiers.15 Between 2016 and 2018, as a
result of a Supreme Court ruling that was subsequently
reversed, the playing of the national anthem was made
compulsory in every cinema before a film was screened.
It was not uncommon during this period to read news
stories reporting vigilante attacks against people who
were unable or unwilling to stand for the anthem.16
In her account of the visual politics of Indian nation-
alism, Srirupa Roy argues that ‘the reproduction of the
nation-state rests not on the existence of individuals
who identify with the nation but rather on their ability
to identify the state as the nation’s authoritative rep-
resentative.’17 She suggests that this ability is acquired
through repeatedly encountering rather than necessarily
believing in the official imagination of nationhood. As
she explains, ‘the sights and sounds of the nation-state
clutter public space, and it is their familiarity or pervas-
iveness rather than their persuasiveness that engenders
public recognition.’18 Recognition of the state as the
authoritative representative of the nation is a complex
affective transaction shot through with fear of state viol-
ence, gratitude for its benevolence, enchantment at its
spectacle and boredom with its familiarity. Importantly,
Roy’s account of the institution of nation-statist ideology
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in India focuses not on its most recent iteration under
the Hindu Right but on the early postcolonial decades
of what is typically referred to as the ‘Nehruvian’ state.
This begs the question of what might have changed given
the intensification of the deployment of this ideology as
a disciplinary apparatus under the current ruling dis-
pensation. How are the emotional valences of symbols
transformed in a context in which the state seeks to sat-
urate public space with them in an attempt to repair what
it sees as a deficit in public recognition of its ability to
represent the nation? What happens to the affective and
political capital of symbols when the state cares more
about their pervasiveness than their persuasiveness?
One answer is suggested by Lisa Wedeen’s landmark
study of the cult of Hafez al-Assad in Syria, which, she
argues, engendered a politics of public dissimulation in
which subjects behaved as if they revered the leader even
if they patently did not.19 Importantly, Wedeen argues
that the spectacles that constitute the authority of the
cult anchor politically significant ideas that ground polit-
ical thinking and frame the way people see themselves
as citizens, even if their claims are not taken literally,
providing a visual and aural language for both complying
with and contesting the regime.20 Separately, Lacanian
psychoanalysts have developed the notion of overiden-
tification to describe how people living under authorit-
arian regimes might attack the norms by which they are
governed not with a direct and straightforward critique
but rather through a rabid and obscenely exaggerated
adoption of them.21 As Slavoj Žižek argues, by taking
the norms of the system more seriously than the system
itself does, overidentification lays bare the hollowness
of regnant ideologies and their claims to obedience.22
Neither of these scenarios for living under authorit-
arianism fully describes what is unfolding in India. Anti-
CAA protesters appear deeply invested in the very sym-
bolic apparatus that has been used to discipline them. At
one level this can be explained quite straightforwardly:
the protesters wrap themselves in national symbols to
obviate the state’s all-too predictable charge of anti-
nationalism. Yet the deployment of these symbols is far
from simply instrumental and defensive. The exuberant
profusion of their creative reconfiguration, the evident
sincerity with which they are invoked, the febrile pitch
of contemporary public discourse and the sheer scale on
which all of this is unfolding suggest that the protesters
retain a faith in the power of these symbols to shield
them from the violence of the state even when they pat-
ently do not. (A widely circulated video from the Delhi
riots shows policemen beating a group of protesters, one
of whom subsequently died, and taunting them by for-
cing them to sing the national anthem.23) This begs the
question of how national symbols have managed to re-
tain a degree of subversive critical potential despite their
deployment as a disciplinary apparatus by the state.
Nationalism against the state
I suggest that the protests against the CAA are better
understood as an instance of what David Lloyd has called
‘nationalisms against the state’.24 Lloyd reminds us that
even as they seek to saturate the field of subject forma-
tion, anticolonial nationalisms are articulated in a variety
of ways with social movements organised around other
logics such as class and gender. When nationalism be-
comes annexed to the territorial state, the processes of
articulation that maintain nationalism as an element of
broader,more complex and internally antagonistic social
fields are brought to an end. Yet these other movements
are never fully absorbed into state-oriented national-
isms, persisting as a potentially disruptive excess over
the nation and its state. As Lloyd explains, ‘the possibil-
ity of nationalism against the state lies in the recognition
of the excess of the people over the nation and in the
understanding that that is, beyond itself, the very logic
of nationalism as a political phenomenon.’25 This ‘ex-
cess’ grows in those historical conjunctures in which the
state becomes increasingly unmoored from the nation
or at least from key constituents of it, as is evident in
the BJP’s unwillingness to consider Muslims a part of the
nation and in its determination to subordinate and/or
expel them from a reimagined Hindu nation-state.26 In
such moments, nationalisms against the state marshal
the symbolic repertoire of nationalism to shame the state
for its betrayal of the nation, with a view to repairing the
disconnect between state and nation.27
This seems precisely to be the import of, for example,
Varun Grover’s defiant poem that in the few short weeks
since it was composed at the start of the protests went
viral,mutating into song and graffiti.28 One stanza reads:
Hum samvidhan ko bachaenge,
Hum kagaz nahin dikhaenge,
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Hum jan gan man bhi gaenge,
Hum kagaz nahin dikhaenge.
We will save the Constitution,
We will not show [NRC] papers,
We will sing Jan Gan Man [the national anthem]
We will not show papers.
Participants in the leaderless movement against the
NRC/CAA have taken on the pedagogical task of remind-
ing both the people and the state of the nation’s founding
ideology. Musicians have resurrected the less well known
verses of the longer poem by Rabindranath Tagore from
which the national anthem is extracted, poignantly draw-
ing attention to lines that affirm the national belonging
of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, Muslims and
Christians – as if to underscore the betrayal inherent
in the CAA in singling out one community for removal
from the nation that the anthem sings into being.29 It is
an enduring irony that the man who wrote the anthem
(as well as the song that became the national anthem of
Bangladesh) was, for much of his life, a fierce critic of na-
tionalism. In his 1917 lectures on nationalism,Tagore de-
scribes the idea of the nation as ‘one of themost powerful
anaesthetics that man has invented’ under the influence
of which ‘the whole people can carry out its systematic
programme of the most virulent self-seeking without be-
ing in the least aware of its moral perversion – in fact
feeling dangerously resentful if it is pointed out.’30
The trope of ‘saving the constitution’, literalised in
the names of political action groups such as the Samvid-
han Suraksha Samiti and the Dastoor Bachao Committee
that have sprung up recently, likewise represents the Con-
stitution as endangered by the state and therefore requir-
ing the protection of the nation. In his book A People’s
Constitution, the legal historian Rohit De attempts to
unsettle the conventional view of the Indian Constitu-
tion as the discursive preserve of state and civil society
elites. He opens the book with an image of the Constitu-
ent Assembly being ‘flooded with telegrams, postcards,
and petitions from schoolboys to housewives to post-
masters, staking claims, making demands, and offering
suggestions’ while it went about its work of drafting the
Constitution.31 The story he tells about the Constitution
in its first decades of existence is one of a document pro-
duced through elite consensus but enlivened by the use
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made of it by ordinary litigants, many from unpopular
minorities whose rights were not always assured by the
majoritarian institutions of the state. But it is still a story
about litigants invoking the Constitution before a court
that they hope will rule in their favour. The CAA’s critics,
in contrast, do not sound like they are waiting for a court
ruling, convinced as they are of the incompatibility of the
CAA with the Constitution and indeed of its potential to
undermine it. It is as if the people have sought a direct
relationship with the text of the Constitution, insisting
on their right to interpret it unmediated by the author-
ity of a secular clergy whose recent judgments have not
always inspired confidence.
The Supreme Court is, at the time of writing, consid-
ering over 140 petitions challenging the constitutionality
of the CAA. While it would be imprudent to anticipate
its conclusions, it is sobering to recall that the Court has
often chosen not to restrain the executive’s majoritarian
excesses, notably in three recent cases that implicate
central elements of the Hindu Right’s vendetta against
Muslims. First, in November 2019, the Court brought
to a conclusion the long running dispute over the Babri
Mosque that had been demolished in 1992 byHindumobs
claiming that the sixteenth-century mosque had been
built on the ruins of a temple that marked the birthplace
of the Hindu god Ram. After decades of litigation, the
Court awarded the disputed site in its entirety to the
Hindu parties despite acknowledging that the demoli-
tion of the mosque was illegal.32 Second, in August 2019,
the Modi government drastically altered the position
of India’s only Muslim-majority province, the disputed
state of Jammu and Kashmir, by revoking the autonomy
guaranteed to it by article 370 of the Constitution and
downgrading its status to that of a territory ruled directly
by the federal government in New Delhi. The move was
accompanied by draconian measures including curfews,
the incarceration of virtually the entire political class and
the longest Internet shutdown ever imposed in a demo-
cracy. In January 2020, the Court ruled that the indefinite
suspension of the Internet violated fundamental rights
but inexplicably declined to pass any specific orders man-
dating relief.33 Third, the NRC exercise in Assam – the
results of which, recall, provided the impetus for the CAA
–was conducted after much stonewalling by politicians
as a result of the zealous oversight of a Supreme Court
bench headed by the then Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi
who is himself Assamese. Indifferent to the obvious con-
flicts of interest at play, Gogoi’s political views as an
Assamese nationalist heavily shaped decisions about the
constitutionality and conduct of the NRC.34
Faced with a fascist executive that commands a su-
permajority in the legislature and is unrestrained by a
supine judiciary, the anti-CAAmovement’s nationalism
against the state seeks to reiterate and protect an en-
dangered vision of the moral values of the nation and
ultimately to persuade or force state institutions to up-
hold those values. Unreliable as it has been as a guardian
of minority rights, the Supreme Court has shown itself to
be attentive to public opinion – for better and worse. For
example, the outcry that greeted the Court’s 2013 judg-
ment upholding India’s colonial-era anti-sodomy law
may have played some role in persuading it to change its
mind five years later.35 In quite a different vein, uphold-
ing the death sentence awarded toAfzal Guru, a Kashmiri
convicted for his alleged involvement in an attack on the
Indian Parliament in December 2001, the Court justified
its decision on the ground that ‘the collective conscience
of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment
is awarded to the offender’.36
Beyond nationalism against the state
Nationalism against the state aspires to strengthen the
hyphen between nation and state to make the state rep-
resentative of the nation from which it has become un-
moored. This is the source of both its power and limits.
Because it looks forward to a re-hyphenated nation-state,
it cannot in good faith be accused of anti-nationalism or
even anti-statism, even if it throws the full weight of its
anger at the current incumbents of the state apparatus.
Yet the presumption of ‘good faith’ in the debate over
the CAA itself betrays a naïve Habermasian faith in the
possibility of consensus on the rules of communicative
reason. Nothing in the nationalism of the anti-CAA pro-
testers protected them from the viciousness of the bad
faith accusations of anti-nationalism that were hurled
at them by the state and its acolytes. The most popu-
lar slogan of the Hindu mobs rampaging through north-
east Delhi was ‘desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maro salon
ko’ (shoot the traitors). In the face of such murderous
disingenuousness, the imperative of solidarity with the
victims and survivors of this pogrom and with their de-
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mands for justice is clear. What follows is offered less in
the register of critique of the normative imaginary of a
movement that could not not have appealed to a certain
kind of nationalism in its struggle against the state, and
more in the spirit of a search for what lies beyond this
imaginary, circumscribed as it is by the telos of the ideal-
ised nation-state. If the very possibility of nationalism
against the state lies in the recognition of the excess of
the people over the officially constituted nation, then the
performance of this nationalism generates excesses of its
own. In this section, I offer some illustrations of such ‘ex-
cesses’ whose claims are difficult to advance even within
the more capacious imaginaries enabled by nationalisms
against the state.
First, the question of Kashmir brings the limits of
this discourse into stark relief. While the struggle for
self-determination in Kashmir has been ongoing for dec-
ades – since the late 1980s in some reckonings and the
inception of independent India in others – it has taken
on a particular urgency since August 2019 in the wake of
the repeal of article 370, the abrogation of which fulfils
the BJP’s cherished ambition of integrating this Muslim-
majority state more firmly into the Indian Union. In this
regard, calls to defend the Constitution can be construed
as a demand to restore the constitutional status quo ante
vis-à-vis article 370. Yet to demand this is not to demand
very much at all: by the time the provision had been
formally abrogated, it had become a shell of its former
self, hollowed out by successive Congress and BJP govern-
ments in New Delhi. There is something disingenuous
in the sudden resurgence of left-liberal interest in Kash-
mir, newly rediscovered as a weapon with which to attack
the BJP, given the historically bipartisan insistence on
its status as an ‘integral part of India’. Many Kashmiris
resent how Kashmir has been drawn into the anti-CAA
protests (if it is remembered at all) as one issue among
many with which to criticise the government, bristling
at the manner in which their demand for azadi (free-
dom) has been appropriated and resignified to express a
plurality of other demands in the slogans of the current
movement.37 The tension arises from the fact that the
desires of those protesting their forced inclusion in the
nation (in places like Kashmir) are fundamentally differ-
ent from those protesting their forced exclusion from it
(in places like Assam), even if both processes are mani-
festations of the BJP’s coercive nation-building. Calls
to protect the Constitution cannot mean much to those
who do not wish to be governed by it – unless the Con-
stitution can contemplate a process by which it will no
longer be applicable to unwilling subjects. But this is
typically where law ends and politics begins.
Second, not enough attention has been paid to how
adivasis (indigenous peoples), who constitute 8.6% of
the Indian population, are likely to be disproportionately
and differentially impacted by the NRC-CAA.While the
politics of indigeneity – specifically the ‘fear’ of power-
ful ethnic groups of being reduced to minorities in their
homelands – has underwritten the NRC, the demand for
documentary proof of citizenship that it has entailed
will be especially difficult for adivasis to meet given the
greater likelihood of their being poor, rural, landless and
nomadic and/or displaced.38 The CAA is unlikely to func-
tion as a safety net for adivasis given that many do not
identify as belonging to the major religious groups to
which it promises citizenship. Indeed the combined ef-
fect of these exercises in governmentality might be to
incentivise adivasis to become Hindus, a process that the
Hindu Right already encourages through campaigns of
coercive inducement that it calls ‘ghar wapsi’ (return
home). Some of the most powerful moments in the
protests against the CAA have arisen from gestures of
everyday fraternity between religious groups – as when
Hindus have formed protective cordons around Muslim
protesters offering prayers, or when Sikhs have set up
langars (community kitchens serving free meals typically
at gurudwaras). Moving as they have been, the very on-
tology of these gestures – in which communities divided
by something that can be identified as ‘religion’ non-
etheless make common ‘political’ cause – can feel ana-
lytically incommensurate with what Alpa Shah calls the
‘sacral polities’ of adivasi lifeworlds in which distinctions
between religion, politics and economics have never been
very meaningful.39 In such lifeworlds, the constitution-
alism of the current nationalism against the state can
seem presumptuous. In recent years, a movement known
as Pathalgadi has spread particularly through adivasi
villages in the state of Jharkhand. Responding to the
threat of dispossession posed by land acquisition legisla-
tion, the movement has made itself visible through the
erection of gigantic stone plaques quoting extracts from
the Constitution that protect adivasi rights at the en-
trances to villages. Yet Pathalgadi evinces a paradoxical
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constitutionalism, asserting the exclusive sovereignty
of gram sabhas (village assemblies) while in the same
breath denying the sovereignty of other levels of govern-
ment.40 As some participants in themovement explained
to journalists: ‘We have all descended from nature and
we worship it. We don’t believe in the Indian Constitu-
tion, nor do we recognise government officials.’41
Third, the reference to nature invites us to think bey-
ond the humanist discourses of liberal constitutionalism
to consider how relationships between people and the en-
vironment have produced the current conjuncture. In the
preparation of the Assam NRC, a xenophobic and arbit-
rary adjudication process has conspired with the paucity
of record-keeping by people who are poor, illiterate, and
have often had to move frequently as a result of war,
partitions and environmental displacement, to deprive
nearly two million people of citizenship.42 As Arundhati
Roy writes, the very impermanence of the nearly 2500
shifting, silty ‘char’ islands in the river Brahmaputra on
which many of the most marginal farmers live has meant
an absence of land deeds and other documentation that
might establish their connection to the land as deman-
ded by the NRC.43 Whatever fences and border regimes
are put in place, if current projections of climate-induced
displacement in the region are correct, we must expect
migration only to grow. It is estimated that by 2050,
one in seven people in Bangladesh will be displaced by
climate change, with up to 18 million people having to
move because of a rise in sea level.44 This will offer grist
to the mill of the Hindu Right, which for decades has
used the spectre of ‘illegal migration’ from Bangladesh
to whip up anti-Muslim hysteria in India.
Nowhere in the world are the forms of international
cooperation necessary for better management of land
andwater resources or indeed themitigation of the global
climate crisis adequate to the scale of the task that they
face. But these processes are particularly deficient in
South Asia which remains one of the least integrated
regions in the world thanks to the bitter legacies of Par-
tition, war, contested borders, a lack of complementarity
between economies, and the mistrust that comes from
the sheer disparity in size between India and its neigh-
bours.45 There has been little consideration, even within
the anti-CAAmovement, of the international effects of
an Indian law that presumptively declares the country’s
Muslim-majority neighbours to be persecuting states
while setting itself up as a refuge for the non-Muslim vic-
tims of such persecution. In February 2020, a 20-year-old
woman namedAmulya Leona took to the stage at an anti-
CAA rally in Bengaluru and attempted to lead the crowd
in a chant that began with the words ‘Pakistan Zindabad!’
(‘Long live Pakistan!’). It was unclear where she was go-
ingwith this because shewas violently taken off the stage
by event organisers and police before she could finish;
we hear her repeat the Pakistan slogan several times in-
terspersed with cries of ‘Hindustan Zindabad!’ (‘Long
live India!’).46 A Facebook post by her from several days
earlier suggests that she was trying to articulate a posi-
tion of pan-South Asian fraternity.47 Such views cannot
easily be accommodated even within the discursive and
affective realm of nationalism against the state. The Hy-
derabad MP Asaduddin Owaisi, who was on the stage
at the time and has been the leading Muslim political
voice in the anti-CAA protests, immediately distanced
himself from Leona, undoubtedly mindful of the por-
trayal of Indian Muslims in Hindu rightwing propaganda
as fifth columnists sympathetic to Pakistan. The police
filed charges of sedition against Leona, Hindu vigilantes
offered a bounty for her murder, and even her own father
was publicly critical of her actions.48 And yet, in the
fraught international context produced by the NRC-CAA,
the politically naïve slogans of a young woman with a
terrible sense of timing may be the thing we most need
to hear.
Nationalism in the time of COVID-19
What threats, litigation and even the Delhi pogrom could
not do, COVID-19 has accomplished. A hundred days and
nights after it first began, the sit-in at Shaheen Bagh and
other anti-CAA protest encampments in New Delhi and
elsewhere were cleared by police as part of the lockdown
imposed by the government in the wake of the spread
of the coronavirus. As Raghu Karnad put it, political to-
getherness had yielded to the inexorable logic of social
distancing.49 Popular responses to the pandemic have
sometimes been troubling, featuring racist anti-Chinese
tropes and caste supremacist claims about the putative
superiority of the traditional Namaste as a form of greet-
ing that does not involve touching. The state’s initial
response has tilted heavily in the direction of securitisa-
tion (curfews and lockdowns) with rather less consider-
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ation given to the welfare of people disadvantaged by
these measures.50
Leading these responses has been the figure of the
Prime Minister himself, whose own discourse has been
heavy on symbolism and citizen duty rather than state re-
sponsibility.51 In what seems to have been a trial-run for
a subsequently ordered 21-day lockdown,Narendra Modi
asked people to observe a 14-hour curfew on 22 March
2020, as part of which he urged them to beat on pots
and pans to demonstrate their gratitude for the efforts
of medical and emergency workers. Many appear to have
ignored, forgotten or misunderstood the instructions on
physical distancing, congregating on balconies and in
streets to participate in the moment with enthusiasm.
Whatever superficial resemblance the gesturemight have
borne to spontaneous demonstrations in Italy, Spain and
elsewhere, many who witnessed the moment first hand
described it as evoking the soundscapes of Hindu ritual
especially as people also took to blowing the horn-like
conches commonly used in temple worship. The Leader
had ordered and the People had obeyed. The last Indian
able to stage such impressive shows of symbolic conform-
ity might have been Gandhi.
Rahul Rao is Senior Lecturer in Politics at SOAS University of
London and author of Out of Time: The Queer Politics of
Postcoloniality (2020). Photo credits: Chris Moffat.
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